The Problem of Suspect Parts Viewed from the Landscape of EASA Approved Organisations

Steven Bentley FRAeS – CEO of Sofema Aviation Services

03-07-2026
7 Min read

As an EASA Subject Matter Expert (SME), I have watched the aviation industry wrestle with Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUPs) for decades, but the current operational landscape represents an entirely new level of threat.



Driven by compounding supply chain pressures, extended OEM lead times, and sophisticated fraud networks, EASA's SUP database has surged past 7,700 flagged entries. High-profile international scandals, such as the AOG Technics fraud involving thousands of falsified EASA Form 1 certificates for CFM56 engines, and the recent EASA alerts regarding hundreds of stolen, non-airworthy parts intercepted from the disposal pipeline, prove that the threat is no longer rare; it is a systemic attack vector.


For an EASA Part 145 Approved Maintenance Organisation (AMO), compliance with Part 145.A.42 (Acceptance of Components) is the frontline defense. Here is a deep dive into the 7 major issues Part 145 organizations face regarding suspect parts, backed by anecdotal industry patterns and actionable best-practice solutions.


1. Sophisticated Identity Fraud & "Paperwork Cloning"


  • The aviation supply chain relies heavily on documentation. Today's bad actors do not just forge low-quality certificates; they execute high-fidelity "identity fraud" at the supply chain level. They use genuine PDF editing tools to clone real EASA Form 1 or FAA 8130-3 forms, altering only serial numbers, batch numbers, or life-limited data to match a counterfeit or unapproved part.
  • In recent fraud investigations, receiving inspectors found that checking the listed Form 1 number against an actual MRO's internal database revealed the number was valid, but it had originally been issued for a completely different component five years prior.
  • Best Practice Solution: Shift from passive document reading to Active Source Verification. Cross-reference the issuing agency’s digital portal or directly contact the Quality Department of the certifying Part 145 organization listed on the Form 1 to validate that the specific serial number matches their release logs.


2. Supply Chain Desperation & The Broker Trap


  • With global commercial aircraft production experiencing massive shortfalls and severe engine parts shortages, Part 145 procurement teams face unprecedented pressure to avoid AOG (Aircraft On Ground) situations. When traditional, approved OEMs and Tier-1 distributors quote 40-week lead times, buyers are heavily tempted to turn to secondary markets, unverified brokers, and web-based parts aggregators where oversight is thin.
  • A component buyer, desperate to source an engine fuel booster pump, finds a rogue broker who magically has "New Surplus" stock available immediately. The part arrives with a convincing, though ultimately forged, airworthiness release.
    Important Note – EASA clearly identifies the “End User” as being 100% responsible for acceptance – are you fully utilizing your Compliance Department as part of the Vendor Supply chain assessment?
  • Best Practice Solution: Implement a strict Supplier Risk Scoring System. Enforce a rule that any part sourced outside of an OEM or an AS9120/ASA-100 accredited distributor must automatically trigger an elevated, multi-tiered engineering and quality review before procurement signs off.


3.The Re-Laundering of Discarded & Stolen Parts


A growing issue is the interception of components that are destined for scrap or mutilation. Fraudsters intercept parts from the disposal pipeline, cosmetic-refurbish them (such as stripping and painting used components to appear new, or applying improper weld repairs without engineering data), and re-introduce them into the market with forged tracing records.

  • EASA issued an urgent alert warning the industry that hundreds of turbofan engine parts, formally declared non-airworthy and marked for destruction, were stolen and funneled back into the global marketplace.
  • Best Practice Solution: Part 145 workshops must enforce Definitive Mutilation Practices for all scrap parts (e.g., cutting through critical dimensions or drilling holes) and keep meticulous destruction certificates.
  • On the incoming side, receiving inspectors must be specifically trained to look for "cosmetic masking" such as fresh paint over pitting, non-OEM vibro-peening, or stripped and replaced data plates.


4.Substandard "Blind" Receiving Inspection Techniques


Many Part 145 stores rely on purely administrative receiving inspections, checking if the part number matches the PO and if a form is attached. However, physical anomalies are often the only true giveaway of a counterfeit or illegally altered part.
Without proper tooling and specific physical inspection training, storefront inspectors miss highly technical red flags.

  • Counterfeit landing gear bushings and fasteners superficially match approved models but fail instantly under load because they lack certified material heat-treatment or correct alloy composition.
  • Best Practice Solution: Equip the receiving bay with high-magnification digital microscopes, precise dimensional measuring tools, and comparative weight scales. Maintain a "Known Good Component" library or digital photo archive so inspectors can compare the texture, markings, font types, and markings of an incoming part against a verified genuine OEM sample.


5.Inadequate Training on EASA / FAA Bi-Lateral Differences


EASA Part 145 personnel frequently misinterpret the precise legal boundaries of acceptable dual-release documentation under the EASA-FAA Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement (BASA). Differences in how the FAA handles "Surplus" parts versus how EASA classifies acceptable components under Part 145.A.42 create legal loopholes that suspect parts can slip through.

  • A U.S.-based repair station releases a component on an FAA Form 8130-3 under "regular" domestic rules without checking the specific EASA block for a dual-release. The EU Part 145 store accepts it anyway due to sheer volume, inadvertently installing a part that does not meet European continuing airworthiness rules.
  • Best Practice Solution: Mandate recurrent, targeted SUP Detection and Regulatory Compliance Training (specifically tailored to 145.A.42 and FAA AC 21-29D guidelines) for all logistics, purchasing, and certifying staff. The training should heavily focus on identifying missing block validations on release forms.


6.The "Fear of Reporting" & Slow Information Sharing


When a Part 145 organization discovers a suspect part, the internal reflex is often to simply return the part to the vendor for a refund and wash their hands of the issue. Formally reporting an item via the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) system under Regulation (EU) 376/2014 takes time, invites regulatory scrutiny, and can lead to legal pushback from suppliers. This lack of reporting allows bad actors to simply sell the rejected part to another, less-vigilant MRO.
• A Compliance Manager flags a part as suspicious, alerts the vendor, receives a swift refund, and returns the part. Two months later, that exact same serialized part turns up at a neighboring MRO facility.
• Best Practice Solution: Cultivate a transparent Just Culture internally where reporting a SUP is celebrated as a safety success. If a part's origin cannot be verified, it must be legally quarantined in a secure, locked "SUP Cage" and reported to EASA via the portal prior to negotiating returns with the supplier, effectively pulling it out of circulation.


7.Lack of Serialization & Traceability on Non-Critical Parts


While life-limited parts (LLPs) and critical engine components are heavily tracked, commercial aircraft contain thousands of non-serialized standard parts, fasteners, and consumables (such as cabin items, seals, and brackets). Fraudsters heavily target these items because they lack unique serial tracking, making it exceptionally easy to mix counterfeit or uncertified batches into legitimate store stock.
• Counterfeit cockpit utility components or non-aviation-grade seals are mixed into bulk bins, escaping detection until they cause premature system leaks or smoke in the cabin.
• Best Practice Solution: Apply batch-level verification and look for physical irregularities in bulk shipments (such as mismatched packaging materials, unusual fonts on labels, or unbranded boxes). Part 145 organizations should also actively monitor and subscribe to EASA’s Lost and Stolen Parts Database to ensure they aren't buying batches linked to known facility breaches.


Next Steps 


Sofema Aviation Services (SAS) and Sofema Aviation (SA) Provide Classroom, Webinar & Online training. Explore 525+ aviation courses at Sofema, or contact [email protected] for support.

Tags:Aviation SafetyEASA Part 145Aviation Supply ChainSuspected Unapproved Parts (SUPs)Aircraft Maintenance (MRO)Regulatory ComplianceQuality AssuranceSofema Aviation (SA)

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