What Makes Parts Critical and who decides?
- Who Decides: A component is determined to be critical either by the Design Approval Holder (DAH) during the initial product certification process, or otherwise by the Authority for the State of Design (SoD).
- What Makes Them Critical: These parts are typically identified by specific maintenance and lifecycle criteria.
They include parts for which a replacement time, inspection interval, or a related safety procedure is explicitly specified in the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) or within the certification maintenance requirements of the manufacturer's maintenance manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA).
How are they produced?
- PMA Definition: An FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) is a combined design and production approval issued for modification and replacement articles, allowing a manufacturer to produce and sell them for installation on type-certificated products.
Production Pathways
- Traceability Requirements: To be accepted for distribution, they must be produced under an approved quality system and accompanied by documentation that ensures strict traceability to the FAA-approved Production Approval Holder (PAH) and conformity to the approved design data.
- Production Pathways: Under the guidelines, critical PMA parts can be produced using one of two primary data frameworks:
- Two Data Frameworks: The guidelines recognize that critical PMA parts are categorized by whether or not they use a licensing agreement.
Under a Licensing Agreement: This path is correct; it denotes parts conforming to design data obtained directly from the original TC or STC holder. Under TIP Rev 7 Amdt 1 paragraph 3.3.4.2, these are eligible for direct EASA acceptance if the underlying TC or STC has been validated by EASA.
Without a Licensing Agreement: This path is also correct; independent development occurs via identicality without a licensing agreement, or through test reports and computations.
According to paragraph 3.3.4.3 and 3.5.3.2(c), critical components design-approved via these methods are explicitly classified as Non-Basic and require an equivalent EASA STC.
How are they Certified?
The certification and validation pathways differ significantly depending on the relationship with the original design holder:
- Direct EASA Acceptance (Licensing Pathway): EASA will directly accept an FAA PMA approval without further showing if the part is a critical component that conforms to design data obtained under a licensing agreement from the TC or STC holder, provided that the underlying TC or STC has already been validated by EASA.
- Technical Validation Pathway (Non-Licensing Pathway): If the critical PMA part is produced without a licensing agreement, it is automatically classified as a Non-Basic project. This means it cannot be automatically accepted and must undergo a formal Technical Validation process by EASA to receive an EASA STC.
- Export Certification Marking: Upon export, specific certifying language must be written into the remarks block of FAA Form 8130-3:
If produced under a license: "Produced under licensing agreement from the holder of [INSERT TC or STC NUMBER]."
If the PMA holder also holds the EASA STC: "Produced by the holder of the EASA STC number [INSERT FULL REFERENCE]."
Challenges from the point of view of EASA acceptance
- Higher Level of Involvement: Because independent (non-licensed) critical PMA parts trigger a "Non-Basic" classification, they require an extensive EASA validation work plan rather than a streamlined administrative sign-off.
- Stringent Data Burden: Applicants face challenges compiling the specialized validation package required by EASA, which must include detailed technical overviews of the data sent to the FAA and robust safety-communication protocols.
- Maintenance Facility Restrictions: U.S.-based repair stations operating with EASA Approved Maintenance Organization certificates face restrictions; they cannot routinely incorporate FAA critical PMA parts as subcomponents during maintenance or alterations unless specific, highly traceable documentation conditions are met.
- Automatic Revocation Dependencies: If a critical PMA part's approval is surrendered, withdrawn, or terminated in the U.S., EASA is structurally obligated to execute a parallel enforcement action to revoke its corresponding STC.
Can a critical PMA part be created through an STC? If so, how?
Yes, a critical PMA part's design can be approved via an FAA-issued Supplemental Type Certificate (STC).
- The Validation Process: For this part to be valid for installation on an EASA-certified or validated product, EASA must explicitly validate that FAA-issued STC.
- The Non-Licensed STC Process: If the PMA design was approved via identicality or test reports/computations without a licensing agreement, the applicant must apply to EASA, and EASA must issue an equivalent STC.
Application Requirements: To achieve this, the application submitted to EASA must include:
- The FAA PMA approval and all supplements, detailing how it was granted.
- A comprehensive overview of the technical data submitted to the FAA.
- Actionable descriptions of the mechanisms used to notify users of any safety-impacting changes made by either the PMA holder or the original TC holder.
Critical Part PMA concerns in general
- Continuous Airworthiness Responsibility: Because critical parts have a direct impact on aircraft safety, the FAA retains strict, ongoing responsibility for the continued airworthiness of all critical PMA parts manufactured under its authority. The FAA is required to investigate all non-compliances and formally notify EASA of corrective actions.
- Mandatory Unsafe Condition Tracking: If an unsafe condition is identified on a critical PMA part, the FAA must immediately notify EASA. This obligation persists even if the PMA holder is in the middle of surrendering their certificate.
- The "Two-Way" Change Awareness Risk: A central operational concern is keeping the end-user informed of safety variances from two separate design entities. Systems must be in place so that the user is alerted if the PMA holder alters the part , or if the original TC holder introduces a design change that inadvertently creates a potential safety conflict with the installed PMA part.
Technical Alignment Assessment
Definition and Control of "Critical Components"
- The Misunderstanding: The text asserts that for an FAA-PMA part, it is the PMA holder-rather than the regulator or the original Type Certificate (TC) holder-who defines and controls the "critical" nature of the component.
- TIP Reference from Section 1.13 (Page 13):
"Critical Component | A part identified as critical by the design approval holder (DAH) during the product certification process or otherwise by the Authority for the State of Design (SoD). Typically, such components include parts for which a replacement time, inspection interval, or related procedure is specified in the Airworthiness Limitations section or certification maintenance requirements of the manufacturer's maintenance manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness."
- The Correction: A component’s criticality is a fixed, non-negotiable attribute established solely by the original Design Approval Holder (DAH) or the sovereign State of Design (SoD) authority during initial certification. A PMA applicant has zero legal authority to define or alter a part's criticality; rather, their entire engineering approval path is dictated by it.
The Functional Design Baseline of a PMA
- The Misunderstanding: The text incorrectly states that the regulator has approved the PMA holder to manufacture the "original" part.
- TIP Reference from Section 1.13 (Page 17): "Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) | For FAA: means a combined design and production approval issued for modification and replacement articles. It allows a manufacturer to produce and sell these articles for installation on type certificated products."
- The Correction: PMA holders are never authorized to produce the "original" part baseline. Under the legal definitions of this agreement, they are strictly approved to produce modification or replacement articles engineered to safely map onto an existing type-certificated framework.
PMA Integration into Type Certification Architecture
- The Misunderstanding: The text argues that PMA parts are completely divorced from type certification, existing entirely as independent, "stand-alone" design certificates.
- TIP Reference from Section 3.3.4.3 (Pages 27-28): "The PMA part is a 'critical component' and the PMA design was approved via: (a) An FAA-issued STC and EASA has validated the STC; or (b) Identicality without a licensing agreement per 14 CFR section 21.303 and EASA has issued an equivalent STC; or (c) Test reports and computations per 14 CFR section 21.303 and EASA has issued an equivalent STC."
- The Correction: Independent (non-licensed) critical PMA parts do not exist in a vacuum. To be legally installed and recognized under this bilateral agreement, their design must be directly integrated into the type certification architecture via a validated or equivalent Supplemental Type Certificate (STC).
Sovereign Airworthiness Determinations vs. Operator Responsibility
- The Misunderstanding: The text claims that because PMA parts are separate from the original TC baseline, the final technical determination of whether a part will cause an aircraft to become un-airworthy rests solely upon the aircraft owner at the time of selection.
- TIP Reference from Section 3.1.2 (Page 25): "This TIP is based on continuous communication and mutual confidence between the FAA and EASA and establishes the process for implementing the acceptance of each other's compliance determinations and approvals on civil aeronautical products and articles."
- TIP Reference from Section 3.3.4 (Page 27): "EASA shall directly accept all FAA PMA approvals, without further showing, for modification and/or replacement parts for installation on products certified or validated by EASA in the following cases..."
- The Correction: While an aircraft operator is responsible for final configuration management, they are not left to unilaterally guess or determine the baseline engineering airworthiness of an alternate part. The entire governance of "tip_rev7_with_amdt1_incorporated_2.pdf" mandates that the aviation authorities themselves evaluate, determine compliance, and formally execute the legal "acceptance" or validation of that design's safety baseline.
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